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ABSTRACT
Design, Implementation and Analysis of a Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm
with Applications
by
Sourabh Ghose
Dr. Yoohwan Kim, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Computer Science Department 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Cryptographers need to provide the world with a new encryption standard. DES, 
the major encryption algorithm for the past fifteen years, is nearing the end of its useful 
life. Its 56-bit key size is vulnerable to a brute-force attack on powerful microprocessors 
and recent advances in linear cryptanalysis and differential cryptanalysis indicate that 
DES is vulnerable to other attacks as well. A more recent attack called XSL, proposes a 
new attack against AES and Serpent. The attaek depends much more critieally on the 
complexity of the nonlinear components than on the number o f rounds. Ciphers with 
small S-boxes and simple structures are particularly vulnerable. Serpent has small S- 
boxes and a simple structure. AES has larger S-boxes, but a very simple algebraic 
description. If the attack is proven to be correct, cryptographers predict it to break AES 
with a 2^80 complexity, over the coming years.
Many o f the other unbroken algorithms -Khufu, REDOC II, and IDEA-are 
protected by patents. RC2 is broken. The U.S. government has declassified the Skipjaek 
algorithm in the Clipper and Capstone chips.
iii
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If the world is to have a secure, unpatented, and freely- available encryption 
algorithm, we need to develop several candidate encryption algorithms now. These 
algorithms can then be subjected to years of public scrutiny and cryptanalysis. The 
purpose o f the thesis is to discuss the requirements for a standard encryption algorithm.
DCA (Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm), a new private-key block cipher, is 
proposed. The block size is user defined, and the key can be of infinite length. The 
algorithm is a first o f its kind dynamic algorithm in which almost all components change 
depending of the password itself used to generate a key or encrypt a file. The “Key 
dependency” has been pushed to the extreme with dynamically linked eomponents like 
number of rounds, operation used on each bits, shift window, direction of each operation 
(Left or Right), size o f the key buffer when encrypting a file, size of the block shuffle and 
working file block.
The aetual encryption o f data is performed in two modules. Key generation and 
File encryption and is very efficient on all microprocessors. Key generation is a complex 
procedure of Key Padding, Concatenating bits, initial scrambling, key encryption and 
final scrambling. File encryption consists of complex steps of initialization, seeding and 
shuffling. All default settings can also be changed by the user, which means the 
knowledge required to decrypt/reproduce a key gets extended to the environment settings 
as well as the password itself.
IV
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a sensitive subject that affects everyone. Common techniques to safe 
guard privacy are:
- When writing a confidential letter an envelope is used to send it.
- When using a credit card a secret code number is used.
- Speaking to someone in private.
In case of computers, sensitive data is common (e.g. assessment grades, financial 
accounts, etc). With the Internet, the computer can be used like a telephone or like a post 
office, with the disadvantage that everybody connected to the network could have access 
to the data. This is why, especially with computers, privacy is important. Different levels 
of security (computer security, network security, etc) have to be considered.
Cryptography can be compared to an electronic safe where private data is hidden. 
The cryptographer must always think about the intruder. Cryptography can be compared 
to a chess game, in that we must think not only of our own tactics, but also of our 
opponents. Cryptography usually uses a lot of mathematieal formulae and logieal 
functions. The science is quite new for the public, this is why it is a very difficult subject, 
but now more people are interested in it and a lot of book dealing with the subject have 
been written and it is now easy to find good cryptography information. It seems that the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
strongest cryptography algorithms are now available to the public even if it is very 
difficult to understand them. Indeed, the best way to know if a cryptography algorithm is 
strong is to make its source code and documentation available to the public. If no one can 
break it then it is safe to use it.
l .I  Terminology
To make the thesis easier to understand, here are definitions of terms used in the text. 
Clear text: An understandable message, usually the original.
Cipher text: An incomprehensible message, usually the result.
Password: A secret string of characters.
Encrypt: Transform a clear text into a cipher text, usually with a password.
Decrypt: Transform a cipher text into a clear text, usually with a password.
Key: Some data that will be used into the message encrypt process. It can also be used 
like a password, the difference is in this case that it is a long string of characters and 
numbers one cannot remember as is very long and complex. A key could be compared to 
a cipher password.
Private Key: This key is personal and only known by one person.
Public Key: This key is available to everybody, it is now secret.
1.2 Algorithms Types 
Here is a general overview of these two cryptography standards.
Private Key algorithm:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A private key algorithm uses one password (or one private key) to encrypt a 
message, to decrypt it the same password is used. The same algorithm or a different one 
can be used to crypt and decrypt.
Public key algorithm:
A publie key algorithm consists of a public key (B) used to encrypt a message and 
a private key (A) used to decrypt the message, for one public key there is one private key 
(A l, B l) and only the private key that belongs to the public key can decrypt a message 
encrypted by the public key.
Due to this, everyone can use the public key, if  someone wants to send message, 
they encrypt the message with the receiver’s public key, and only the receiver, who 
knows the private key, can decrypt this message.
This algorithm can also be used to sign a message to prove that it is really the 
sender who is sending a message, to do so the sender encrypts the message with his 
private key that can be decrypted only with the public key.
1.3 Cryptography Standards
Introduction
A lot o f cryptography algorithms have been created, it is not the aim of this report 
to go into great detail about cryptography, so only two of the most famous and used 
cryptography algorithms are going to be quickly explained to give a general idea of how 
to encrypt a message.
DES
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DES stands for "Data Encryption Standard" and is at the moment the most used 
algorithm in the world, being used by the American government to secure their sensitive 
data. It has been created by IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) in 1977 
and is a private key algorithm.
It is a block cipher algorithm that crypts data by 64 bits length block, that means 
that the clear text is divided into 64 bits length block and each block is encrypted by 16 
complex operations. The entire 64-bit length encrypted block constitutes the final cipher 
text. The decryption algorithm is nearly the same as the encryption algorithm, the same 
key (the private key) is used to encrypt and to decrypt a message; the bigger the private 
key is the safer it is.
RSA
RSA is the initial of the name of its creator: Ron RIVEST, Adi SHAMIR and 
Leonard ADLEMAN. It is one o f the first public key algorithms and was created in 1978. 
In fact there are two algorithms, one to generate the keys and one to encrypt/decrypt the 
message; the pair of keys, one public and one private, are based on big first numbers and 
are the result of some calculations (modulo, Euclid’s algorithm, etc). The algorithm that 
encrypts/decrypts a message is a block cipher algorithm that is simpler than the DES 
algorithm but is much slower.
The security of this algorithm is based on mathematical theories (big numbers 
factorization), even if no real proof has been given to demonstrate that these 
mathematical theories are not easily "breakable", they have not been broken for 20 years.
These two algorithms have different concepts, but neither o f them is better than 
the other, they have their own advantages. A good idea is to use both of them choosing
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which one depending on its suitability to a specific job. It is why DES is usually used to 
encrypt the message, and RSA is used to communicate only the DES private key used to 
encrypt the message.
The reason for this choice is because DES is faster than RSA and more difficult to 
break. However, to communicate the DES private key a secure solution has to be found. 
RSA has a good level o f security and the user does not have to send his private key to the 
recipient, only the publie key is to be transmitted. This is why RSA is used to encrypt the 
DES private key, followed by the message and then sent to the reeipient.
1.4 Possible Applications 
The aim of this seetion is to give concrete examples o f professional eryptography 
used, which will help the reader to appreciate more the work done on the project.
1] Login password; Here the password typed by the user is encrypted and eompared to 
with the user's enerypted password stored in the password database. If the user did not 
make any mistakes while typing his password then the two cipher texts will be identical 
and the user is allowed to log onto the system.
2] Pretty good Privaey; This is a famous application for encrypting personal data such as 
letters, emails, a file or anything else found on a computer; because it is very powerful 
and has been developed on almost all existing computers (PC, Macintosh, Amiga, etc). In 
fact, it is the first application that has been developed for public as a pose to military use. 
It is maybe why PGP is becoming a standard application on computers. The only problem 
is the lack o f a good Graphical User Interface (GUI).
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1.5 Common Cryptography Attacks
Introduction
There are different ways to attack a cryptography algorithm. If the algorithm 
security is only based on its secret, once someone finds the algorithm source code it will 
be very easy to break it.
Algorithm attacks
Sometimes a cryptography algorithm can have weak points, for example, with 
algorithms that just consist of adding the same number to all the password letters they are 
easier to break. This is because it is simple; all that is to be done it to find the number 
used. This attack needs strong cryptography knowledge and understanding. It is only used 
for bad cryptography algorithms, but as with everything relating to computer science; it is 
very difficult to totally avoid making errors, so this attack is always the first one 
attempted. If no weak points are found the only attack that can be done is the "brute 
force" attack. Some advanced techniques used are Linear and Differential cryptanalysis 
which will be discussed later in the thesis.
Brute force attack
This attack is based on the cipher text generated by a cryptography algorithm. If 
the attacker can get into the password database, and even if  all the passwords in it are 
encrypted, software exists that simply try every possible passwords, encrypts them and 
compares the cipher text generated with the one held in the password database. O f course, 
it would take too long to try all the possible passwords, present computers are not fast 
enough and there are too many possibilities.
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Keeping these in mind, Cryptographers need to provide the world with a new 
encryption standard. Many o f the unbroken are protected by patents. If the world is to 
have a secure, unpatented, and freely- available eneryption algorithm, we need to develop 
several candidate encryption algorithms now. These algorithms can then be subjected to 
years of public scrutiny and cryptanalysis. Then, the hope is that one or more eandidate 
algorithms will survive this proeess, and can eventually become a new standard. The 
purpose o f the thesis is to discuss the requirements for a standard encryption algorithm. 
While it may not be possible to satisfy all requirements with a single algorithm, it may be 
possible to satisfy them with a family of algorithms based on the same cryptographic 
principles. It introduees a new cryptographie algorithm and goes on to discuss how the 
algorithm overcomes known attacks like Linear and Differential eryptanalysis. It 
identifies a potential weakness in the algorithm and goes on to describe how the 
algorithm overcomes it.
DCA (Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm), a new private-key block cipher, is 
proposed. The block size is user defined, and the key can be of infinite length. The 
algorithm is a first o f its kind dynamic algorithm in which almost all components change 
depending of the password itself used to generate a key or encrypt a file. The “Key 
dependency” has been pushed to the extreme with dynamically linked components like 
number of rounds, operation used on eaeh bits, shift window, direetion of each operation 
(Left or Right), size o f the key buffer when encrypting a file, size o f the block shuffle and 
working file block.
The actual encryption of data is performed in two modules. Key generation and 
File encryption and is very effieient on all microprocessors. Key generation requires a
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seed as input, whose size is N/2 for key size N. Key generation is a complex procedure of 
Key Padding, Concatenating bits, initial scrambling, key encryption and final scrambling. 
File encryption consists of complex steps of initialization, seeding and shuffling. All 
default settings can also be changed by the user, which means the knowledge required to 
decrypt/reproduce a key gets extended to the environment settings as well as the 
password itself.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several Cryptography algorithms have been designed in the past. Discussing all of 
them is beyond the scope o f this project. However the major ones have been listed 
according to their type.
2.1 Message Digest Algorithms 
As an Internet standard (RFC 1321), message digest algorithms have been 
employed in a wide variety o f security applications, and is also commonly used to check 
the integrity o f files. A message digest hash is typically a 32-character hexadecimal 
number. Recently, a number of projects have created message digest "rainbow tables" 
which are easily accessible online, and can be used to reverse many hashes into strings 
that collide with the original input.
MD5:
Designer:
Ron Rivest 
References:
[16], [17], [18], [19], [20]
Digest length:
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16 bytes.
Block size:
64 bytes.
Max. final bloek size:
55 bytes.
State size:
16 bytes.
Comments:
• A transcription error was found in the original MD5 draft RFC. The 
corrected algorithm should be called MD5a, though some people refer to it 
as MD5.
This is wrong; the corrected algorithm should be called MD5, and is in 
practice never referred to as MD5a.
• MD5 is big-bit-endian, little-byte-endian, and left-justified.
Security comment:
Hans Dobbertin has found a method of generating collisions for MD5's 
compression function. Quoting from RSA Laboratories Security Bulletin #4: 
“Given the surprising speed with which techniques on MD4 were extended to 
MD5 we feel that it is only prudent to draw a cautious conclusion and to expect 
that collisions for the entire hash function might soon be found. In addition, the 
128-bit output is arguably not long enough to make generating collisions using a 
birthday attack infeasible.”
10
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Ripemed-320:
Designers:
Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, Bart Preneel 
Published:
April 1996
Alias:
"RIPEMD320"
References:
[21], [22], [23], [24]
Digest length:
40 bytes.
Block size:
64 bytes.
Max. final block size:
55 bytes.
State size;
20 bytes.
Comment:
RIPEMD-320 is big-bit-endian, little-byte-endian, and left-justified.
Security comment:
This message digest is not claimed to provide a security level higher than 
RIPEMD-160. SHA-384, SHA-512 or Whirlpool is used instead.
1 1
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SHA-512:
Designers:
U.S. National Security Agency 
Published:
October 2000
Referenees:
[25]
Digest length:
64 bytes.
Block size:
128 bytes.
Max. final block size;
111 bytes.
State size:
64 bytes.
Comment:
SHA-{256,384,512} are big-bit-endian, big-byte-endian, and left-justified. 
When the compression function is used directly, it is considered to inelude 
the chaining variable addition (as opposed to being separate as shown in 
the specification).
2.2 Message Authentication Code Algorithms
12
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A cryptographic message authentication code (MAC) is a short piece of information used 
to authenticate a message. A MAC algorithm accepts as input a seeret key and an 
arbitrary-length message to be authenticated, and outputs a MAC (sometimes known as a 
tag). The MAC value protects both a message's integrity as well as its authenticity, by 
allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message 
content. A Message Integrity Code (MIC) is another name for a MAC.
HMAC (Digest);
Designers;
Mihir Bellare, Ran Canetti, Hugo Krawczyk, Adi Shamir 
Published:
June 1996 
Aliases:
"HmacMDS" is an alias to HMAC(MD5) [JDK compatibility] 
"HmacSHAl" is an alias to HMAC(SHA-l) [JDK compatibility]
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.1 " is an alias to HMAC(MD5)
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.2" is an alias to HMAC(SHA-l)
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.3" is an alias to HMAC(Tiger)
"1.3.6.1.5.5.8.1.4" is an alias to HMAC(R1PEMD-160)
(source for OlDs from
iso.org.dod.internet.seeurity.meehanisms.ipsec.isakmpOakley tree)
• "http://www.w3.Org/2000/02/xmldsig#hmac-shal " is an alias to 
HMAC(SHA-l)
References:
13
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[26], [27], [28], [29], [30]
Parameters:
• String digest [creation/read, no default] - the name of the Block 
MessageDigest on which this MAC is to be based.
Key length:
Any multiple o f 8 bits that does not cause the maximum input length for the 
MessageDigest to be exceeeded. Default 128 bits.
Output length:
Minimum 32 bits, maximum equal to the message digest output length. The 
default is equal to the message digest output length.
2.3 Symmetric Key Algorithms 
Symmetric-key algorithms are a class of algorithms for cryptography that use 
trivially related cryptographic keys for both decryption and encryption.
The encryption key is trivially related to the decryption key, in that they may be 
identical or there is a simple transform to go between the two keys. The keys, in practice, 
represent a shared secret between two or more parties that can be used to maintain a 
private information link.
Other terms for symmetric-key encryption are single-key, one-key and private- 
key encryption. Use of the latter term can sometimes conflict with the term private key in 
public key cryptography.
AES256 (Advanced Encryption Standard):
14
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Designers:
Joan Daemen, Vincent Rijmen
Alias:
"OpenPGP.Cipher.9"
Description:
AES256 is defined as Rijndael with a 128-bit block size and 14 rounds. 
References:
[31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41]
Key length:
256 bits.
Block size:
16 bytes.
Security Comment:
• There are claims that the XSL (Extended Sparse Linearization) [42] attack can 
break the AES. Since AES is already widely used in commerce and government 
for the transmission of secret information, finding a teehnique that can shorten 
the amount o f time it takes to retrieve the secret message without having the key 
would have wide implications. Opinions differ on whether the attack works 
because the method is heuristic and very teehnical, and so it has proved difficult 
to evaluate its complexity. In addition, the method is expected to have a high 
work-factor, which unless lessened, means the technique would not reduee the 
effort to break AES very much in comparison to an exhaustive search. 
Therefore, even if the attack has been analyzed correctly, it is unlikely to affect
15
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the real-world security of block ciphers in the near future. Nonetheless, the 
attack has caused some experts to express greater unease at the algebraic 
simplicity o f the current AES.
DES (Data Eneryption Standard):
Designers:
Don Coppersmith, Horst Feistel, Walt Tuchmann, U.S. National Security Agency 
Published:
1976
References:
[43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56]
Key length:
64 bits as encoded; 56 bits excluding parity bits.
Block size:
8 bytes.
Comment:
Implementations MUST ignore (i.e. not check) the parity bits o f keys. 
KeyGenerators for DES MUST, however, output keys with correct parity.
Security comment:
The fixed 56-bit effective key length is too short to prevent brute-foree attacks [2] 
DES is also vulnerable to Differential and linear eryptanalysis.
RC4:
Designer:
Ron Rivest
16
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Published:
September 1994
Alias:
"ARCFOUR"
References:
[57], [58], [59], [60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [71], 
[72], [73]
Key length:
Minimum 8, maximum 2048, multiple of 8 bits; default 128 bits.
Security comments:
• There are small biases at the start of the RC4 key stream.
• The RC4 keystream is distinguishable from random given about 2 Gbytes 
o f the stream.
• RC4 is vulnerable to related-key attacks, and therefore it should only be 
used with keys that are generated by a strong RNG, or by a source of bits 
that are sufficiently uncorrelated (such as the output of a hash function).
2.4 Block Cipher algorithms 
In cryptography, a block cipher is a symmetric key cipher which operates on 
fixed-length groups o f bits, termed blocks, with an unvarying transformation. When 
encrypting, a block cipher might take a (for example) 128-bit block of plaintext as input, 
and output a corresponding 128-bit block of cipher text. The exact transformation is 
controlled using a second input —  the secret key. Decryption is similar: the decryption
17
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algorithm takes, in this example, a 128-bit block of cipher text together with the secret 
key, and yields the original 128-bit block of plaintext.
ECB (Electronic Codebook):
Description:
Electronic Codebook Mode, as defined in NBS FIPS PUB 81.
References:
[74], [75]
Comment:
If a padding scheme is not specified (i.e. the algorithm name is given in the form 
''cipherNamelV.C'Q"), then NoPadding MUST be assumed (note that this is 
intentionally different to CBC and PCBC modes, for which PKCSPadding would 
be used). The standard name always specifies which padding method is used, i.e. 
it always has three components.
Security comment:
ECB mode will always encrypt identical plaintext blocks to identical ciphertexts. 
This can be a weakness when the plaintext is not random, uniformly distributed, 
and a multiple of the block size. If these conditions are not satisfied, a different 
mode should probably be used.
CBC (Cipher Block Chaining):
Description:
Cipher Block Chaining Mode, as defined in NBS FIPS PUB 81.
References:
[76], [77], [78]
18
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Comment:
If a padding scheme is not specified (i.e. the algorithm name is given in the form 
"cipherName/CBC"), then PKCSPadding MUST be assumed. The standard name 
always specifies which padding method is used, i.e. it always has three 
components.
2.5 Asymmetric Key algorithms
RSA:
Designers:
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, Leonard Adelman 
Aliases:
"RSAES", "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1", "2.5.8.1.1"
References:
[79], [80], [81], [82], [83], [84]
Comment:
It is recommended that implementations make no practical restriction on 
the lengths of the key parameters n and e (in particular, values of n up to at least 
4096 bits SHOULD be supported).
Security Comments:
• The most damaging would be for an attacker to discover the private key 
corresponding to a given public key; this would enable the attacker both to 
read all messages encrypted with the public key and to forge signatures. The 
obvious way to do this attack is to factor the public modulus, n, into its two
19
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prime factors, p and q. From p, q, and e, the public exponent, the attacker 
can easily get d, the private exponent. The hard part is factoring n; the 
security o f RSA depends on factoring being difficult. In fact, the task of 
recovering the private key is equivalent to the task o f factoring the modulus: 
use d to factor n, as well as use the factorization of n to find d.
Patent status:
RSA is patented in the United States and Canada (see references); the patent is 
licensed by RSA Data Security, Inc.
20
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CHAPTER III
ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Introduction
The Dynamic Cryptography algorithm has the following features: 
-Private Key Algorithm 
-Dynamic Cryptography Algorithm
-Source code can be public without making the algorithm weak 
-Multiplatform application
-Infinite key length (as big as the integer type being used)
-Bilateral bits swapping with variable windows
-Bilateral Pseudo randomly binary operations
-Dynamic Variables changing in functions of the password, such as:
-Round, Block Shuffle, etc
-Key buffering against key dependency attacks
-Addition of a random number to the key
-Random Number Generator (RNG) using the ISAAC Algorithm 
-Possibility to specify own RNG seed
-5 different crypt's level (allowing to choose between efficiency 
and speed)
-Seed and shuffle functions
21
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-Seed and shuffle functions
-A clear text can be encrypted using its own data
-Two methods of execution: direct disk access or memory cache
-Strong Key generator
The DCA has been made as dynamie as possible; this means almost all of its 
components will change depending of the password itself used to generate a key or 
enerypt a file. This is called “Key Dependency” (KD) and has been pushed to the 
extreme in the DCA with dynamically linked components such as:
The number of rounds
The operation used on each bits
The shift window
The direction of each operation (Left or Right)
The size of the key buffer when encrypting a file 
The size o f the block shuffle and working file block.
The algorithm behaviour changes to great extent when used with different passwords.
All default settings can also be changed by the user, which means the knowledge required 
to decrypt/reproduce a key gets extended to the environment settings as well as the 
password itself.
Algorithm Overview:
The algorithm is made of a number of modules and sub-modules.
The Key Generator module 
The File Encryption module
22
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The “file decryption” module has been left out in purpose as it is nothing more than 
running the “file encryption” module backwards.
3.2 Key Generator Overview
Pre-requisites
There are a number of pre-requisites to this module:
Seed source:
The Seed can be a password, a key, or the result o f a random algorithm (ISAAC, 
time/date based, or user customised).
- Keylength Output:
The minimum keylength that can be generated is 128bits. Larger keys will be a 
multiple o f 128. There is no upper limit to the size of key.
- Keylength Input:
The seed must be at least of size N/2 when generating a key o f size N. In other 
words, when generating a 128bits key and using a password, the user must enter a 
password of at least 8 characters (8*8bits = 64bits).
Terminology
KD -  Key Dependant -  a value which is “Key Dependant” will be different each time a 
different key is used.
P R N -  Pseudo Random Number -  In general, all references to Random Number in this 
document should be taken as a reference to a Pseudo Random Number.
23
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LO  -  Logical Operation -  This can be also referenced as a XO R, AND, NOR, NAND, etc
LFSR  - Linear Feedback Shift Register -  Algorithm used to generate /W V  with the least 
repetition possible for its output numbers.
Integer Size is 32 bits -  The use of a 32 bits hardware platform is assumed.
ISA A C  -T h is  is a fast cryptography random generator ereated by Bob Jenkins and used 
in the DCA. The details o f the ISA A C  Algorithm will not be discussed in this document.
Below is a description of the different Key Generator steps:
- STEP 1 : Key Padding
If the initial seed used to generate the key is not equal to the size o f the keylength 
to be generated some Pseudo-Random numbers (KD) will be inserted at a position 
with is KD.
- STEP 2: Bits Concatenation
The seeds bits will be stored into one long string of bits. An Integer array will be 
used for this purpose and the size of each element will be dependant of the 
hardware platform used: 64, 32 or 16 bits, (or even 128, 256, etc when available).
- STEP 3: Initial Scrambling
24
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The different seed bits will be combined together to generate a Pseudo Random 
Number (which is therefore KD). This PRN will then be added to the each seed 
element. Eaeh time the PRN is added it will change (KD).
STEP 4: Key Encryption
The seeds will now be referenced as the key. Each of its bits will be treated 
individually and will be subject to some Logical Operations (LO). This is called 
“a round”. In each round the following happens: 
o A bit swap or a LO
o The distance between 2 bits (Shift Window) is KD 
o The nature o f the operation (a swap or LO) is KD 
o The number of round is KD 
o The direction of the round is KD (left or right)
For each key generated the minimum number o f rounds is two, this will ensure 
that all bits have been swapped at least once AND have had a LO.
The number o f rounds is also KD.
STEP 5: Final Scrambling
A PRN is generated if no random seed is provided and will be added to each 
element o f the Key. Each time the PRN is added it is changed using a Linear 
Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
25
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3.3 Key Generator Details
Length = L Saving password 
into Pass_clear[]
Nb o f Char to 
add =  NB ADD
Na Nb Nc Nd
YesPOS> L  ?
No
Stop
YesNb of Char
<  NB ADD ?
No
Stop Figure 3.1 Key Padding
Nc +  Nd = POS
H|E|L|L|0|W |0|R|L|D
Na = Na +  1 
Nb = N b +  1 
POS -  POS +1
INSERT New Char in Pass clear]POS]
IndexA Pass clear] Na| % Li 
IndexB = Pass clear]Nb] % Ll
New C har = Pass clear]lndexa] & Pass clear]lndexb]
Nc = P O S / 10 
Nd = P O S - ( N a *  10)
i.e.: if  POS = 25 then Nc = 2 and Nd = 5
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72 I 69 I 76 I 76 I 79 I 87 I 45 I 34 1 103 | 23 | 12 | 10 | 79 | 82 | 76 | 68
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  Password in clearT
01001000
01000101 Conversion in bits and concatenation
01001000010001011010 . .
If using 16 bits integer
Figure 3.2 Bits 
Concatenation
Figure 3.3 Initial Scrambling
See Figure 3.3a - Add() - Random Generation
and Figure 3.3b - Add() - Pass code Generation
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If using a 
128 bit KEY, 
with 16 bits 
integer
XOR
XOR
0110100010000001
---------------- Pseudo-Random
010001101100110
0100100001000101
0100100001000100
0000111010001001
0100100001000100
0100100001000101101000110110011011 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 . . .
number PRN-i
Figure 3.3a - Add() - Random 
Generation
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Q 0100100001000101 10100011011001101 I o il  .I
0100100001000101 G
If using 16 bits integer
0000000000000101
Shift window SWa
0110100010000001
Pseudo-Random 
number PRN-i
Circular shift o f  PRN-i using the SW  
window
I.e.; if  SWa = 0101 = 5
Then 5 bits will be shifted from the
left to the right.
0001000000101101
------------------ N ew P R N -i+I
G G
Using new PRIN-i+1
Same process as
G > . n j ©
0100100001000101
If using a 
128
bits KEY, 
with 16 bits 
integer. 
Pass clear
0101100001101000 0001010010011000 1 11.. 1 1  I  I I
New string generated. 
Pass code
Figure 3.3b - AddQ - Pass code 
Generation
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The following diagram describes an overview of this process:
Figure .3.4c - Swap( )
Figure 3.4a - 
Swao( ) - Init
Figure 3.4d - Swap( ) - 
Operation
Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo 
Generation
PH A SE 1: Repeat until all bits have 
been through either a SW AP or 
OPERATION
PH ASE 2 Repeat PHASE 1 until the 
number of ROUND is finished 
(default Round = 2)
Figure 3.4 - Swap( ) 
Overview
The following 4 diagrams describe the detailed process:
Figure 3.4a - Swap( ) - Init
Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo Generation
Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) - Direction
Figure 3.4d - Swap( ) - Operation
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M odulo_Big = K EY LEN G TH  -  2 
M odulo Small = M odulo Big / 2 
i =  0
In itia l is a tio n
0101100001101000 I 0001010010011000 I 11.. I .. 
1101110101001011
Pass code I 3Pass code) fl Pass code| 1 | Pass code| 2
Vo (Round +1)
XORXOR XOR
Additional Rounds AH'
Round + AR
New Dynamic round DRound. (max 
value is 2x original nb of round)
Operation
(either 0 or 1)
Direction 
(either 0 or 1)
Modulo 
(either 0 or 1)
Yes
m odulo sw ap = 
m odulo big
Modulo
=  0?
No
modulo swap= 
modulo small
Figure 3.4a - 
Swap( ) - Init
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Pass code
OlOllOOOOllOIOOO I  0001010010011000 I  11.. I  .. . . .  1 . 01  11 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
P a ssc o d e l i | 
(  XOR 1
Pass codel i+1
modulo swap
until
i=KEYLENGTH
modulo session
modulo session
Shift window S W i
Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) - 
Direction
Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo 
Generation
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Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo 
Generation
Direction
XOR
LEFT D irection
Pass code
11011101010010110101100001101000
Yes
=  0 ? SVV6
j  Bit B = pass_codc( i+SWI>i-l ji  Bit A = pass codel i )No
RIGHT Direction
Pass code
11011101010010110101100001101000
Bit A = pass code| KEYLENGTH -1 - i
Figure 3.4d - Swap( ) 
- Operation
Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) - 
Direction
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Figure 3.4c - Swap( ) - 
Direction
Yes
SW APOperation
=  0 ? BitBBit A
No
Opération Choice = pass codel i + I ] %5Opération Choice = pass code| i j %5
Bit A BitB
CHANGING 
Bit A and B
Choice 0 = Bit A *XOR* Bit B
Choice 1 = 1 *XOR* (Bit A *OR* Bit B)
Choice 2 = Bit A *OR* Bit B
Choice 3 = Bit A *AND* Bit B
Choice 4=1 *XOR* (Bit A *AND* Bit B)
New Bit A New Bit B
Yes
Modulo Swap 
= Modulo Big Modulo Swap = Modulo Small
No
Modulo Swap = Modulo Bi;
Figure 3.4b - Swap( ) - Modulo 
Generation ----------------Operation = Operation *XOR* 1
Figure 3.4d - Swap( ) - 
Operation
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Initialisation
i = 0
Pass code
If using 16 bits integer
R andom key
New Random key
Yes
i o  Index 1
No
i =  i+ 1
Figure 3.5 Final 
Scrambling
Index I
0001000111100011 1001000101010110
LINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTER (LFSR) 
(W ith  a d if fe re n t p rim itiv e  po lynom ial w hen using  6 4 ,3 2  o r  16 bits
Pass code|i]
Pass rodeji
XOR
New Random key
If no random number is already provided in the function parameter, then: 
Generate Random key either with the ISAAC algorithm or with the system  
time.
Pass code|lndex 11
Pass code|lndex 1]
XOR
Random key
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The important functions are discussed below with and example for 512 bits key 
generation.
Key generator
The key lengths that are generated are powers o f two (e.g. 2^x, 128 bits, 256, 512, 
1024, etc). To generate a key there are two different methods: randomly or pseudo- 
randomly. For the random method, 16 random characters are generated and stored in the 
memory. For the pseudo-random method, the user is asked to type some characters that 
are then stored in the memory, the maximum number of characters that can be entered is 
16. 16 characters correspond to a key length of 128 bits, this is because one character is 
represented by 8 bits on a computer, therefore 16 characters represent 128 bits (16 * 8 = 
128), 32 characters represent 256 bits (32 * 8 = 256) and so on. Then several functions 
are used to generate a key, using these characters which are stored in the memory like a 
password, this string o f characters is called: "pass clear".
The number o f different combinations is higher with the Random method (2**128) than 
with the Pseudo-Random method (72**16 i.e. approximately 2**99). This is because the 
user has to type some characters and there are only around 72 symbols readily available 
on a standard keyboard. If only un-shifted alphanumeric characters are used then the 
round falls to around 2**83 combinations.
Test length function
It is important that the key's length is always the same, so if the length of the 
"pass clear" string is inferior to the key's length, some characters are then added to the 
string. The number of characters the user has to type must be at least half the number of 
characters in the key. Each new added characters is the result of an AND logical 
operation between two characters randomly picked up in the "pass clear" string of
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characters. Now, if the key to be generated is 128 bits (which correspond to 16 
characters) the new "pass clear" length is 16 characters.
When generating a key of more than 128 bits, first a 128 bit key length is 
generated and used to generate a 256 bit key length, and so on. This is possible because
the first key has got the minimum number of characters required to generate the
following key (128 bits = 16 characters, 256 bits = 32 characters, 512 bits -  64 
characters, etc). The key generated then becomes the password for the following key. The 
different steps during a 512 bits key length generation are:
•The user types 16 characters as a password.
•If  less than 16 characters are typed; some new characters are generated to reach the 16 
characters needed.
•A key (A l) o f 128 bits is generated from the password typed at the step 1.
•The key (A l) is used to generate another key.
•The key (A2) of 256 bits is then generated from the Key (A l).
•Because the key (A l) is twice inferior to the key (A2), the same process used at the step 
2 has to be done, but this time, we check if there are at least 32 characters (256 bits) in 
(Al).
•The key (A2) is used to generate another key.
•W e repeat step 6 but this time with (A2).
•The final key (A3) is a 512 key length.
37
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Password OH Random generation flag by Soiembh
Key
Generator O
Kigtlitosy 
karfh^
YES
NO
1 r
K«5r2" K*yl
1
K>ey2= K*y3
K*y2 ; NO
K ey ■ A m
Generator 'C ^ ^ p
KjÿhJsey
Jenjth?
YES
C & Z I
Figure 3.6 Long key generation 
Transcription function
The string o f character "pass clear" is converted into a string of numbers called 
"pass code", these numbers are the ASCII code of each character contained in the 
"pass clear" string.
Additional function
It is better not to directly manipulate the ASCII code contained in the "pass code" 
string. This is why a number will be added to each number contained in this string by an 
Exclusive OR operation. This number is generated in function of the password itself. To
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make it safer, each time the number is added it is different we do this by using a circular 
bit shifting.
Swapping function
This is the main part of the algorithm, all the numbers contained in the pass code" 
string are considered to be only one long string of bits. First, the bits are swapped with 
each other; each swap takes place between two bits that have a distance o f X bits.
The cipher password is a long string of integer, each integer o f this string will be assigned 
to X. Because while doing this bit swapping process the cipher password will be 
consistently changing so will the string of integer and therefore the value of X. X should 
never have the same value. The swap starts from the bit B i at the position 0 with the bit 
at the position B l + X I. After, from the bit B2 at the end o f the string with the bit at the 
position B2 - X2. This continues with the second bit o f the string B3 and the bit B3 + X3, 
and with the next to last bit B4 with the bit B4 - X4, and so on. In fact, as shown in, the 
following rule is respected;
Swap bit I with bit I + X 1
Swap bit 'endofstring' - 1 with bit 'endofstring' - X2
This starts again with 1 = 1 + 1 and a different X from the "swap length" array.
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Sotgaàh Ghost
Swap 1 S w ^  2
KEY = 0 1
4
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 ..
4
. 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0  1 A
-  1 Î Î Î J
Swap 3 Swap 4
After S w ^  1 :
KEY = 0  1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 , . 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 I 1 1 0  1
J
After Swap 2 ;
'■
KEY = 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 . . 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0  0
After Swap 3 ;
KEY = 0 0 1 1 0  0 1 1 0  1 - , . 1 1 1 0  0 1 0  0 1 1 1 0  0
After Swap 4 :
KEY = 0 0 1 1 0  0 1 1 0  1 .. 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Figure 3.7 Bit swapping 
This is called bilateral bit swapping, with this function all the bits will be swapped
around.
The second part o f this swapping function is the same process, but this time 
instead o f swapping bits around, a pseudo-random binary operation, function of the 
password itself, will be generated. There are 5 different types of binary operations; 
Exclusive OR, NAND, NOR, OR, AND.
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The way the algorithm works is that it alternates a swap and a logical operation 
each time. The algorithm does this in a loop until all the bits have been used (in a swap or 
a logical operation), the user can change the "round" of this loop with a parameter: it is 
the number o f loops the user wants the algorithm to perform. By default it is 2 (which is 
also the minimum) as with this value we are sure that ALL the bits have been used in a 
swap AND a logical operation.
By changing the value of the round the user is changing the result generated.
Also, the algorithm will:
- Start from the right or the left o f the bits string
- Start by a swap or a logical operation.
When this is finished there is a new “pass code” string, which contains numbers 
totally different from the start.
Coding function
To make this encryption algorithm more efficient, a final part has been created. A 
random number is added to each number of the "pass code" string. This random number 
is initialized at the beginning o f the function. Each time this random number is added, its 
bits are shifted to the left, the value of this shift is a number generated in function of the 
character contained in the "pass clear" string. Therefore, each time the random number is 
added, it is different. Due to the random number, even if the user types the same 
password to generate the key, he can have 2^31 different keys (if we use a long random 
number = 4 bytes = 32 bits).
The random number will be hidden in the key at a position that will depend on the 
cipher string, because when a user types his password again we need to recover it. The
41
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key generation will then follow the same process as the first time it was done. To recover 
this random number, if  the password is right the algorithm will know its position. 
Otherwise, the position will be wrong as will the random number used in the coding 
function and the key generated will be different.
The user can choose 2 ways to generate a random number: using the standard C 
function or use the ISAAC algorithm created by Bob Jenkins. The default RNG is 
ISAAC. The initial seed will be initialized by the /dev/random or /dev/urandom device if 
present on the system, otherwise it would be the result of “time() + cloekQ”. We are 
aware that the second method hasn’t got a big entropy for the pool o f numbers, therefore 
the user can overwrite the seed value in his application really easily (for example: after 
the binit() call just add the line: varinit->SEED = 666, to set the SEED to 666).
3.4 File Encryption Overview
Process
Below is a brief description of the different File Encryption steps 
STEP 1 : Initialization
o The file is mapped into a virtual array and spit into blocks. The length of 
the block is KD. 
o Several keys are generated from the password or keyfile 
o Only one key will be generated with a random number, encrypted and 
inserted into the encrypted file. The insertion position is KD. 
o That random key will be used to generate a PRN.
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STEP 2: Seeding
o A number o f keys (KD) will be generated and stored into a Key Buffer 
using a derivation of the initial key generated and the PRN previously 
generated as the random seed, 
o From that key buffer 2 keys will be selected (KD) and an AN D  will be 
conducted. The result is an Encryption Key. 
o A block will be selected from the file virtual array (KD) and an XO R  will 
be conducted with the Encryption Key. 
o A New key will be derived from one o f the 2 keys used in creating the 
Encryption key and replace one of the 2 keys, 
o The process repeats again at STEP 2 until all the blocks have been 
encrypted (seeded).
STEP 3: Shuffling
o The same virtual array used in STEP 1 will be used again, 
o Two blocks will be selected (KD).
o One out of three possible LO  will be conducted (KD) on those two blocks.
The result is an Encryption block, 
o A third block will be selected (KD) as the block to be encrypted and an 
XO R  will be conducted with the Encryption Block, 
o One of the two blocks used to generate the Encryption block will then be 
selected to be the next block to be encrypted (KD).
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o The process start again at STEP 3 until all the blocks, but the last two, 
have been encrypted (shuffled), 
o The last 2 blocks will be encrypted using an XO R  with 2 new keys 
generated. Not shuffling the last 2 blocks is required for the decryption 
process.
44
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3.5 File Encryption Details
Figure 3.8a -  file_crypt() -  Init and Figure 3.8b -  file_crypt() -SeedQ - Random 
Generation
C lear Text File
Hello World,
This is a test file in clear text which we are about to 
encrypt. First we are going to “split” that file into a 
number of blocks.
Length = Bloek shuffle
Block
1
8 10
Red Square = Single Bloek crypt
11
Tab Seed 
and
7  Tab Shuffle
Password O R Key File
Key Generator
N o t  using random 
number
( OnMl )
Key Buffer = Key_Buffer + IV Keyl 0 | 
(Max 2x original Key buffer value) IV Key
Initialisation
i =  Pass_code| 1 |
Dynam ic shuffle =  IV_Key[ 11 % 32 ( if  using 32 bits integer) 
Block shuffle =  Dynam ic shuffle +  Block shuffle 
Block crypt =  File length in bytes
Block shuffle is define with the following rules:
a) It must be a multiple o f  4 bytes ( if  using 32 bits integer)
b) Block crypt / block shuffle >= 6
Figure 3 .8 a -  
file_crypt() -  Init
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Initialization
Key Buffer = 1 6  (Can be changed by user)
NB index =  K EY LEN G TH  / 32 (when using 32 bits integer)
IV KEY
Key Generator
Not using random 
number
( Cod» ) )
Key Generator
With random 
number
PasscodeB Codc_key
, Code_key[ 0 ]
X O R
No
i = i +1 
i > NB Index ?
Yes
Figure 3.8b -  file_crypt() -SeedQ - Random Generation
RN
RNXOR
XOR
First RN
New RN
RN = First RN RN = New RN
Pos key = Pass_codeB| 0 ) % block_crypt 
Tab seed|Pos key| -  1 (not to be used again)
In sert “encrypted” random key into file  at 
postion  “Pos K ey ”
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Key Generator
With RN as a random number. 
Because of LSFR RN will 
change each round
Store Key i into 
KeybufTer a rray .
Pass code»
Pass codeB = Key i
Nb ot Key 
generated 
Key buffer?
Keybuffer_array|indexB|
Tab Seed|Pos| 
I ? Pos = Pos + 1
Pass codeC
Yes
indexA = Pass_codeB| 0 | 
indexB = PasscodeB! 1 ] 
Pos = Pass codeBI i |
Keybuffer arraylindexA]
New IndexA and IndexB 
must be different from 
previous IndexA
— I ------------------
Block at 
Position Pos
hde to S
Crypted Block PasscodeB = 
key bn f fe ra  rray [ I ndcx B|
Replace tile clear text block with the 
crypted block Tab_Seed|pos| = I
Figure 3 .1 0 a - 
file_crypt() -  
ShuffleO - 
Initialization
All file cleartext 
^  ^  blocks seeded'’
Kcyi
Replace Keybuffer array! IndexAj 
with Key i
Figure 3.9 Seeding
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Figure 3.10 Shuffling
See Figure 3.10a -  file cryptQ -  Shuffle() - Initialization
And Figure 3.10b -  file cryptQ -  ShuffleQ - Position & Operation
And Figure 3.10e -  file cryptQ -  ShuffleQ -Last 2 bloeks
Initialization
index = IV _K ey|0]
PosA = IV K ey (Index]
PosB = IV Key [Index + 1 1 
Random seed =  IV Key [Index + 2]
Pos cry p i =  “ last block” (this is because the last block may have a variable size)
Length shuffle = Length file /  Block shuffle (number o f  shuffle block in the file to crypt)
Figure 3.10b -  file cryptQ -  ShuffleQ 
Position & Operation
Figure 3.1 Oa -  file cryptQ -  ShuffleQ - Initialization
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Figure 3.10a -  file_crypt() -  Shuffle() - Initialization
Yes Till) shiifflclI’osAI =
No
Yes Tiib_sliiinic|PosA] =
No
File to Shiiflle
Block at
Position “I’osA”
Position
“PosB”
i k
Figure 3.10b -  
file_erypt() -  
ShuffleO - Position
Yes All block file 
shufflecl7
No
Yes
Pos_crypt is an 
Odd number?
No
Sliiimed BLOCKS
Pos_cr}|it = PosA
Cry pted BLOCK
XOR
PosA = PosA + 1
PosB = PosB + I
Opération Choice = (PosA + PosB + Pos crypt i % 3
Replace file block with the crypted 
block Tab Shufllel Pos crypt] = 1
RN = LFSR(Random Seed) 
PosA -  RN % Length_Shiiine
RN = LFSR(Random Seed) 
PosB = RN % Length Shiifne
Choice 2 = NOT ( Block]PosA] AND Block]PosB] )
Choice 0 = Block]PosA] OR Block]PosB]
Choice 1 = NOT ( Block]PosA] OR Block]PosB) )
Figure 3.10b -  file_crypt() -  ShuffleO - Position & Operation
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Figure 3.10c -  file cryptQ -  ShuffleQ -Last 2 blocks
STOP
IV Key
Key G enerator
Not using random 
number 
( C ijtlc l' ) )
XORKey 1
Key G enerator
Not using random 
number 
( Codef ) )
XORKey 2
Block Lastl
Block Last2
Last 2 block files:
Block Lastl and Block Last2
They cannot be shuffled. Instead, they are 
each encrypted as follow.
Figure 3.10c -  file cryptQ -  ShuffleQ -Last 2 blocks
All the KD highlighted in the above steps can be changed to static values, enable 
or disable. The same is true for the size of the "block crypt" as shown Figure 3.10d
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Alternative Block Crypt size. This means that all the above steps can either be conducted 
across the entire file or within smaller “working blocks”.
Red Squares = Multiple block erypi
Block
Figure 3.10d -  Alternative Block Crypt size
The encryption algorithm provides two methods to encrypt files: 
Encrypting a file from a password typed by the user that will be transformed into a key, 
or from a key that has already been generated with the Key generator function, described 
earlier. If the user wants to use a very long key length, such as 2048 bits, as it is not really 
possible to remember a long password, he will have to generate a key and store it in a 
secure area; this key will become the password. The user can also choose to encrypt a file 
without a password or a key generated with the key generator function. He can simply 
choose an existing file, and the key will be some of the data in this file (most of the time 
in the middle o f the file). This could be really useful if the user does not want to store a 
key file.
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There are 5 different power levels to encrypt a file.
Seed function
First, a "file array" is defined, if the user uses a 128 bit key length, the algorithm 
will calculate how many blocks of 128 bits there are in the file that is going to be 
encrypted. The "file array" will have as many indexes as there are blocks o f 128 bits in 
the file. Each block will match one of the indexes of the "file array". There are only two 
values that can be found in this array, 'O' when the block has not already been encrypted, 
and ']' when the block has been encrypted.
There is a new feature in the new algorithm:
Many keys will be generated and stored in a buffer. By default, 16 keys are 
generated. Then the 2 keys will be pseudo randomly selected, mixed together. The key 
will be used as a filter by doing an Exclusive OR between the data contained in the file 
and the key. The position o f the block file's data (where the filter will be added) is a 
function o f the "pass clear" string. This is why when we encrypt a file the blocks 
sequence and the blocks length that is going to be encrypted depends on the password 
used to encrypt the file. Each time a filter is added, the "file array" is updated to be sure 
that a filter will not be added twice at the same position.
When a filter is used, a new key is generated. As a result, the key used as a filter 
is always different and always a function of the previous key that has been generated.
To decrypt a file, since an Exclusive OR has been used to encrypt the file, we 
simply encrypt the cipher file with the same password again to remove the filters.
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Something important is that when the keys are generated it is not possible to add a 
random number, because it is not possible to find it again, once the key has been added to 
some data.
This is why with this algorithm, with one password, or key, the user has only one 
cipher text.
Password
OR
Key File
Key generator
i
Key
Logical OR «ith the block's file
Figure 3.11 File encryption and key generation
Random Seed function
The idea was to be able to have more than one cipher text when the same clear 
text was encrypted with the same password. This can be achieved by using a random 
number in the key generation process. This algorithm is nearly the same as the standard 
one, but this time ONE random number is generated and encrypted using the same
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password used to encrypt the clear text. It is then inserted in the cipher text, still at a 
position function o f the "pass clear" string. After, this random number is used in the key 
generation. Therefore, with this algorithm for ONE password and ONE clear text there 
are MANY cipher texts.
To decrypt the cipher text, the random number is extracted from the cipher text 
first and the cipher text is encrypted again with the password typed by the user and this 
random number. If it is the right password, the right random number will be extracted, the 
right keys will be then generated and the algorithm will generate the right clear text.
This algorithm is very strong, indeed if someone tries to decrypt a cipher file, he 
will never be sure that he has found the right clear file.
Shuffle function
As for the file seed function we divide the file into blocks (by default block's 
length = Default integer width = 4 bytes on Linux)
From the last cipher password generated we are going to extract pseudo-random numbers 
to find 3 file locations:
- position to crypt (pos crypt) (we always start with the last block)
- position A used in the crypting process (posa)
- position B used in the crypting process (posb)
The algorithm takes the blocks at the position A and B and does a logical operation 
between them (as a function o f the cipher password): OR, NOR, NAND.
Then it adds the result (MASK) with an Exclusive OR to the block at the position 
poscrypt.
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Then, one o f the blocks used to encrypt (A or B) will become the new position to encrypt. 
The choice between A and B is done by checking if  the position that has just been 
encrypted (pos crypt) is an odd number or not. If it is then the new encrypt position will 
be pos A otherwise it will be pos B.
This is done to prevent 2 blocks to be used together more than once to encrypt another 
block.
Now there are 2 blocks in plain text (in fact they've been "seeded" before) so 2 new 
cipher passwords are generates, from the one sent as a parameter to this funetion and is 
added to the block with an Exclusive OR.
This function is initiated by encrypting the last block of the file. This is because of the 
way we divide the file into blocks; If the key's length is 128 bits and the file's length is 
260 bits then we have got 3 blocks of 128 bits, but the last block only has 4 bits from the 
file. If we were using this block in the "shuffle" process this would be weak.
Therefore the algorithm does not use it and encrypts it at the start of this function.
The way the algorithm decides which block is going to be encrypted and which blocks 
are going to be used to generate the MASK is function of the password itself. It uses the 
value o f the password (A) in a LINEAR FEEDBACK SHIFT REGISTER FUNCTION 
(LFSR). This enables the algorithm to generate many different numbers (B) from (A). An 
LFSR is really useful to generate a sequence of pseudo random numbers that are always 
the same if generated from the same initial number.
This function has been taken from the book from Bruce Schneier Applied cryptography 
Second Edition. The algorithm initializes the LFSR with the password itself. It also uses a 
different primitive polynomial modulo 2 in function of the length o f the "shift register"
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the user is using (16, 32 or 64 bits).
This part is really important as the file is then encrypted with its own content.
If we use the seed and shuffle function to encrypt a file, to decrypt we first need to 
"unshuffle" and then "unseed" the encrypted file.
“UNShuffle” function
The algorithm repeats the process as in the file shuffle function except that it does 
not make any changes on the file at first. We store the different erypt positions and bloeks 
that are used to create the masks.
We then have 3 arrays:
position^ = position o f the block which will be encrypted 
crypta[], cryptb[] = position of the 2 blocks used to create the mask
For example: 
position[5] = 500 
crypta[5] = 232 
cryptb[5] = 1300
This means that the 6th bloek to be encrypted was the bloek number 500 using the blocks 
232 and 1300 to generate the mask.
When the algorithm has filled up these 3 arrays, it then decrypts the last 2 blocks and 
starts from the end o f the array to the beginning to un-shuffle the file.
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We can compare that to a "cards castle" once we have done the castle if we want to 
remove the cards without breaking the castle we need to take out the last card (on the top) 
and then the next one, etc in a reverse order.
Dynamic Variables
This is one of the prominent features of the algorithm.
The following variables:
•ROUND
• BLOCK SHUFFLE
• BUFFER KEY (used in the seed function, tells the algorithm how many keys to be 
stored in the buffer).
• MODULO SWAP (which is used in the swap functions and tells the algorithm how big 
or small can the bits swap process should be.) These variables can be set to be dynamic or 
static (default = yes).
If set to dynamic, the algorithm will change its value as a function of the password 
entered. The minimum value is the default value entered for these parameters, and the 
maximum is double the default value.
For example:
if ROUND = 2, then with the dynamic option ROUND could be a value between 2 and 4. 
If ROUND was equal to 10, then it could be a value between 10 and 20.
The MODULO SWAP changes at each round.
All the other Dynamic variables change as block is encrypted.
By default we encrypt a file as one big block, so these values will change only once.
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CHAPTER IV
ALGORITHM APPLICATIONS 
Two applications using the cryptography algorithm were first created for UNIX 
(such as Linux, SunOS, Silicon Graphics, HPUX, etc.). The reasons for this choice were 
because this system is the most used in the computer world. Also, because no graphical 
user interface needed to be created, these applications could be created faster.
These applications have been created using the C language. They all use a library 
which contains all the cryptography functions created for this project and only consist of 
a user interface for the use of this library. Particular attention has been given to the error 
check in these applications. Even if they are badly used, an understandable error message 
is displayed. The following applications have been designed:
Encrypt/Decrypt file application:
This application is used to encrypt or decrypt a file. Some parameters have to be 
set by the user: the password, the file to encrypt/decrypt, the destination file, the length of 
the key, the encrypting power method, the round of the key generator used. The user can 
even specify a custom crypt's block length and a custom shuffle's block length. There is 
also an interactive mode where the application is prompting you for each parameter 
required. This is a security enhancement if the user does not want someone doing a 'ps' 
looking at his parameters
Secure chat, similar to the 'talk' UNIX command:
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Secure chat, similar to the 'talk' UNIX command;
This application can be used to have a secure conversation over a network 
(Internet for instance). It uses a stream encryption method.
Key generator application:
This application is used to generate a key which will be stored in a file. Some 
parameters have to be set by the user: the password or the random generation flag, the 
destination file and the key length to be generated.
Login application similar to the UNIX system:
This application, is used when a user wants to log onto the system. Parameters 
must be set by the user, such as his password and the location o f the password database 
which contains his cipher password.
Password management application:
This application is quite similar to the key generator application but the key 
generated is stored into a password database with the user login name. Some parameters 
have to be set by the user such as the user name and his new password. If the user already 
has a cipher password stored into the password database, he will have to re-type his old 
password to be able to change it with the new one.
Hide/Extract engine application:
This application is used to hide a file in another file or to extract a previously 
hidden file. The user can choose to hide a file at the beginning or at the end o f another 
file. This is a completely separate part o f the cryptography called steganography. It will 
be too long to create a strong steganography algorithm so this is why it is only a simple 
algorithm (Added to the beginning or at the end of a file). This part will be done, because
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even if the algorithm is simple, it could be useful. This is because, with this algorithm, if 
the user wants to hide a file into a picture, video or sound file, it becomes invisible.
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CHAPTER V
ALGORITHM ANALYSIS 
This section evaluates how the DCA successfully evades two powerful symmetric-key 
block cipher cryptanalysis techniques: Linear Cryptanalysis [3] and Differential 
Cryptanalysis [4].
5.1 Linear Cryptanalysis
Introduction
Linear Cryptanalysis tries to take advantage of high probability occurrences of 
linear expressions involving plaintext bits, "ciphertext" bits (actually we use bits from the 
2nd last round output), and subkey bits. It is a known plaintext attack: that is, it is 
premised on the attacker having information on a set of plaintexts and the corresponding 
ciphertexts. However, the attacker has no way to select which plaintexts (and 
corresponding ciphertexts) are available. In many applications and scenarios it is 
reasonable to assume that the attacker has knowledge of a random set of plaintexts and 
the corresponding ciphertexts.
The idea is that, for each candidate subkey, we partially decrypt the cipher and check if 
the relation holds. If the relation holds then increment its corresponding counter. At the 
end, the candidate key that counts furthest from Vi is the most likely subkey.
The Piling up Lemma:
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Suppose X I, X2,... are independent random variables from {0,1}. And
Pr[A, = 0] = p , , i = 1,2,... Hence,
P r [ A , = l ] - l - p , ,  1 = 1,2,...
The independence o f Xi, Xj implies
Pr[A; = 0 , y — 0] — PiPj
P r[A ,= Q ,A ^= l] = p , ( l - p , )
P r[A ,= l,A ^ = 0 ] = ( l-p ,)p ^
P r [A ,= l,A ^ = l]  = ( l - p , ) ( l - p , )
Let ,,2 denote the bias of A, © • • • © X
k
k  -  I
Then  = 2 0 ' ^ . ,  ■
./ = I
Analysis o f DCA
Consider a function f  that takes an 8-bit input (x) and an 8-bit subkey (k) as input 
and produces an 8 bit output (y). We can write this as y = f(x, k) (mod 2). Imagine that 
DCA had been designed in such a way that we could write the function f  as a linear 
combination o f x and k modulo 2. That is, what if the function f  were designed as y = f(x, 
k) = Mx + Dk (mod 2) where M and D are constant 8 x 8  matrices. The function f  would 
look like this:
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To do this we would only have to change the seeding and shuffling functions to 
linear functions. All XOR’s are already linear functions. For example, and XOR can be 
written like z = i(x, y):
^0 Xq ^ 0
^3
%
(mod 2)
So if  the seeding and shuffling functions were linear equations we could easily 
find a linear function y = f(x, k) (mod 2).
Assume the seeding and shuffling functions are linear function, which we can write as y 
= g(x) = Ex where E is a constant 8x8 matrix;
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> o ‘ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 o ' ’Z(J
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 X l
7 a 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 ^ 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
y * 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ^ 4
y ^ 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
y 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 ^ 7
(mod 2)
DCA has two rounds of the function f  (one for each o f two keys generated from the key 
buffer K1 and K2). So if P is the plaintext and C is the ciphertext, then:
C = f(g(f(P ,K l)),K 2)
=M xg(f(P ,K l)) + DxK2 
=ExMxf(P, K l) + DxK2 
=ExMx(MxP + D X K l) + DxK2 
=ExM^xP + ExM xDxKl + DxK2 (mod 2)
Now define three new constant 8x8 matrices: R= ExM^, S= ExMxD, and T=D.
Even if we use independent subkeys for Kl and K2, we cannot have a linear equation.
If in wcrst case, bit 0 o f the ciphertext is equal to bit 3 o f the plaintext XORed
with bit 4 o f the plaintext XORed with bit 5 of the plaintext XORed with bit 0 o f K l, etc.
We would have similar equations for bits 1 through 7 of the ciphertext. So for a known
ciphertext attack with one plaintext-ciphertext pair we would have 8 equations and 32
unknowns, which does not do much good.
But with 4 plaintext-ciphertext pairs you would have 32 equations and 32
unkowns. Using Gaussian elimination or Cramer’s rule it is easy to see that we could
solve this system with something on the order o f 32 calculations which is no good again.
Steps for performing linear cryptanalysis on DCA
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1] We need several good linear approximations for each linear function. They should 
hold for more than 50% of the possible inputs. Each equation is just XOR’s modulo 2 
(equivalent to XORing them all together) to get an answer of either 0 or 1.
2] We need about 100 plaintext/ciphertext pairs. They don’t have to be chosen plaintext, 
this is a known plaintext attack.
3] Do step 4 for every possible subkey
4] For each plaintext/ciphertext pair that we have
4.1] Find Q, the output of the seeding.
4.2] Find S, the output of shuffling.
4.3] See if  each o f the linear approximations hold for S as input and Q as 
output. We don’t really care what the first key is because any bit in the second key has a 
50% chance o f being a 0 and not touching anything. If it were a 1 then it would change 
one of our S bits but we wouldn’t really care because our linear approximations are still 
biased away from 50%. If S was chosen well then we would expect S and Q to show bias 
with the linear approximations. If S is not anything like the input that was really used 
when the ciphertext/plaintext pair was generated then we’re just plugging in random bits 
for S and Q and we would expect our linear approximations to hold about 50% of the 
time. The subkey that we guess that shows the highest deviation away from 50% is the 
one most likely to be the real key. The level of effort to break the cipher then comes from 
the size o f the subkey and not the key size.
Linear cryptanalysis won’t produce such dramatic results on DCA, because DCA 
does not have many linear functions like S-F networks. The level o f effort to do linear
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cryptanalysis on DCA is still dependent on the size of the subkey, but we need a lot of 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs which makes it pretty much infeasible.
5.2 Differential Cryptanalysis
Introduction
Differential cryptanalysis exploits the high probability o f certain occurrences of 
plaintext differences and differences into the last round o f the cipher. For example, 
consider a system with input A  = [ X \ X 2  . . .  X n ]  and output Y =  [Fi Y i . . .  Y n \ .  Let two inputs 
to the system be X  and X '  with the corresponding outputs T  and Y ' ,  respectively. The 
input difference is given by X X  =  X  @  X '  where "©" represents a bit-wise exclusive-OR 
of the M-bit vectors and, hence,
A A  =  [AAi AA2.. . AAn]
The main difference from linear attack is that differential attack involves 
comparing the XOR of two inputs to the XOR of the corresponding outputs. Differential 
attack is a chosen-plaintext attack. We consider inputs x and x* having a specified XOR 
value. We decrypt y and y* using all possible key and determine if their XOR has a 
eertain value. Whenever it does, increment the corresponding counter. At the end, we 
expect the largest one is the most likely subkey.
In order to use differential cryptanalysis on DCA the attacker would require large 
amounts of plaintexts. The number o f chosen plaintexts needed is dependent on the 
ability o f XOR differences to propagate through a block cipher algorithm (and therefore 
partly dependent on the number rounds) and the computational effort comes from the size
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of the subkey used for each round. The search space o f differential cryptanalysis is the 
subkey o f the last round and not the encryption key.
Steps for performing Differential Cryptanalysis on DCA
1] Choose an XOR difference for the plaintext pairs
Let us go ahead and use an XOR difference o f “ 10000000.” This means that each 
of our plaintext pairs will differ in only the first bit. For example “00000000” will be 
paired with “ 10000000”, “00000001” will be paired with “10000001”, ..., “01100100” 
will be paired with “ 11100100”, ..., and “01111111” will be paired with “ 11111111”.
2] Generate ciphertext pairs for some plaintext pairs
Differential cryptanalysis is a chosen plaintext attack, so we will need access to 
the encryption equipment with the key installed. This doesn’t mean we can see the key, 
though we just need to have access to the equipment.
Now we are going to encrypt 25 randomly chosen plaintext pairs from our 
plaintext pairs above, for a total of 50 encryptions. If our cipher had more rounds we 
would have to do a lot more work.
When we do these 50 encryptions we get 25 ciphertext pairs, paired by the fact 
that both ciphertexts in a pair came from one of the plaintexts o f a plaintext pair.
Plaintext -> Ciphertext 
One pair;
O llllO O l -> 11111001 
11111001 ->11111110 
Another pair:
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01000100 - >  10101100 
11000100 - >  10011001 
A third pair:
00000011 ->01000010 
10000011 - >  10110111 
etc.
3] Get 2 pieces o f information out o f each ciphertext pair
3.1] The first piece o f information we want out o f each ciphertext pair is the input 
to seeding function.
3.2] The second piece of information we need is not so trivial. We are going to 
have to find out what the expected XOR difference that came out o f the shuffling 
function.
4] Try all possible values for the subkey, which is extremely hard with larger keys.
For every subkey, what we have to do is recreate seeding, the 8-bit XOR after 
seeding, and the shuffling for each ciphertext pair. The reason we have to use 25 
ciphertext pairs instead of just one is that there is a chance a false input might get lucky 
and produce the right output, but this won’t happen 25 times. The number 25 has nothing 
to do with the key size or block size so it does not add to our measure of complexity.
Each step has extremely large complexity due to which differential cryptanalysis 
does not produce dramatic results against the DCA.
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5.3 Performance Analysis 
Here are speed benchmarks for some of the most common cryptography 
algorithms compared to the DCA. The test was run on a Pentium 4 2.1 GHz processor on 
Windows XP professional platform. As shown, the DCA is considerably faster than its 
peers.
Algorithm Megabytes(2^20 
bytes) Processed
Time Taken MB/Seconds
DCA 256 3.841 66.649
MD5 1.02e+003 4.726 216.674
Ripemd-160 256 4.867 52.599
SHA-512 64 5.618 11.392
HMAC 1.02C+003 4J26 216.674
AES(256) 256 5J08 48.229
DES 128 5.998 21.340
RC4 512 4.517 113.350
Table 5.1 Speed Comparison of Cryptography Algorithms
Analysis of DCA, AES, 3DES and RC2
For the tests, the Microsoft Application Center Test (ACT) was used, which is 
designed to stress test. Application Center Test can simulate a large group of users by 
opening multiple connections to the server and rapidly sending HTTP requests. It also 
allows us to build realistic test scenarios where we can call the same method with a
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allows us to build realistic test scenarios where we can call the same method with a 
randomized set o f parameter values. This is an important feature, whereby users are not 
expected to call the same method with the same parameter values over and over again. 
The other useful feature is that Application Center Test records test results that provide 
the most important information about the performance o f the Web application.
The algorithms were used to encrypt and decrypt data. Tests were performed with 
a data size o f 4 KB, 100 KB, and 500 KB to see how the size o f data impacts 
performance.
Figure 3.12a Plot o f Request per second against user load, data -  4 KB
Request/Second vs. User Load 
Data size = 4 KB
User Load
RC2
3DES
AES
DCA
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Figure 3.12b Plot o f Response time against user load, data = 4 KB
Response Time vs. User Load
U ser Load
DCA
AES
3DES
RC2
With small data, we find that the DCA is the fastest of all the methods. A key 
length o f 256 bits was chosen.
Next was the AES (Advanced Encryption standard). It has a variable block length 
and key length, which may be chosen to be any of 128, 192, or 256 bits. It also has a 
variable number o f rounds to produce the cipher text, which depends on the key length 
and the block length.
Next was the Triple DES (3DES) was invented to improve the security of DES by 
applying DES encryption three times using three different keys (note that encrypting data 
three times with the same key does not offer any value). It is simply another mode of 
DES, but it is highly secure and therefore slower in performance. It takes a 192-bit key, 
which is broken into three 64-bit subkeys to be used in the encryption procedure. The 
procedure is exactly like DES, but it is repeated three times, making it much more secure. 
The data is encrypted with the first subkey, decrypted with the second subkey, and 
encrypted again with the third subkey.
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RC2 turns out to be the slowest method when the data being encrypted is small. It 
has an expensive computation up front to build a key-dependent table, which apparently 
is high compared to the cost o f encrypting small data.
Figure 3.13a Plot o f Request per second against user load, data = 100 KB
Requests/Second vs. User Load 
Data =100 KB
U ser L oad
-A ES
3D ES
DCA
RC2
Figure 3.13b Plot o f Response time against user load, data =100 KB
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By increasing the size of data being encrypted and decrypted, we see an entirely 
different picture to what we saw in the previous test. RC2 is the fastest, followed by 
DCA, which is around 20% faster than 3DES. Note that the expensive computation in 
RC2 to build the key-dependent table is amortized over more data. AES in this case is the 
slowest; 25% slower than 3DES. Note that we are using a 256-bit key for AES 
encryption, which makes it stronger than the other methods (though there has been some 
press about possible attacks against AES, which might be better than brute force attack) 
and for the same reason the slowest of all. Similarly, we used a 192-bit key in case of 
3DES. Using a same-length key does not necessarily mean that different algorithms will 
have the same strength. Different algorithms have different characteristics and hence they 
may not provide the same strength.
There is always a tradeoff between security and performance. We need to 
understand the value o f sensitive data, the deployment cost, and usability/performance 
tradeoffs before you can begin choosing a right algorithm for securing data. If the cost of 
data that is being protected is high, then we must consider taking a performance hit to 
secure the data. Otherwise, we may be better off using a less secure algorithm.
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Figure 3.14a Plot o f  Request per second against user load, data = 500 KB
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Figure 3.14b Plot of Response time against user load, data = 500 KB
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With the increasing size of data being encrypted and decrypted, we see the same 
trend prevailed in this test too.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
The main problem in this algorithm concept was that it was necessary to always have in 
mind the following words: security, efficiency and portability. Everything has been done 
to respect these keywords.
To conclude, here is a summary of the algorithm specifications originally. All 
initial design goals were met successfully.
- Private Key algorithm
- The source code can be public without making the algorithm weak
- Dynamic Algorithm
- Pseudo Random numbers generated using a Linear Feedback Shift Register and ISAAC 
Algorithm
- Direct disk access or Memory buffer method in order to run on low specification 
computer and Palm devices
- Stream encryption option
- Block encryption option
- Key generator: Bits manipulations, bilateral bits swapping and logical bits operations, 
random generator.
- Encrypt file (using the key generator): Variable length cipher block algorithm.
- 5 Power levels: Seed, Random Seed, Shuffle, Seed + Shuffle, Random Seed + Shuffle.
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- Key length unlimited (as big as your integer type can take).
The algorithm was successfully able to evade two of the most powerful 
cryptanalysis techniques: Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis.
As proposed, the following applications we designed too, highlighting some of 
the applications o f the cryptography suite:
•  Encrypt/Decrypt file application
• Secure chat
•  Key generator application
• Login application
• Password management application
• Hide/Extract engine.
The project applications were tested on many different operating systems (OS): 
Windows 9x, Windows NT, UNIX (Linux, HPUX, Silicon Graphics, and Solaris). 
Because each operating system is different (memory management, permission rights, 
variable management, etc) these tests were very important. For example, a problem 
regarding the way the password was stored in the memory occurred once. No errors were 
generated when the application was running on Linux, but on the Silicon graphics OS an 
error was generated. This was because on Linux the memory management is less strict 
than on Silicon Graphics (or at least at the time on the Linux OS there were not as many 
users as there were on SGI). Therefore, sometimes the application worked fine on the 
Silicon graphics and Windows but not on the SunOS because these first two OS were 
more compliant in certain areas. These tests helped in eliminating several bugs.
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The algorithm has reached its maturity after several iterations and careful 
cryptanalysis. Future work includes designing attack cased against the algorithm.
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